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BEING ALL IT CAN BE: A SOLUTION TO
IMPROVE THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S
OVERSEAS ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
MARGOT LAPORTE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The environmental regulation of overseas military bases and
operations should be an important component of the United States’
foreign and national security policies. The Department of Defense
(DoD) recognized over ten years ago that “America’s national
interests are inextricably linked with the quality of the earth’s
environment, and that threats to the environmental quality affect
1
broad national economic and security interests . . . .” Environmental
degradation, for instance, has been linked to destabilizing forces
2
around the world, including “‘poverty, disease, and suffering.’”
Global environmental issues, including deforestation, oceanic
degradation, biodiversity loss, and chemical pollutants threaten the
3
health and security of U.S. citizens and interests abroad.
Implementing environmental regulations overseas would thus further
national security and foreign policy interests by promoting stabilizing
policies, international cooperation, and goodwill.

* Duke University School of Law, J.D. 2009; Dartmouth College, B.A. 2005. The author
would like to thank Professor Scott Silliman for his inspiration and advice. She would also like
to thank her family, whose encouragement, support, and suggestions were essential to the
writing of this Note.
1. Memorandum of Understanding Among the Environmental Protection Agency, the
Department of Energy, and the Department of Defense Concerning Cooperation in
Environmental Security para. 2 (July 3, 1996), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/
envvest_mou.html.
2. Sherri Goodman, Deputy Under Sec’y of Def. for Envtl. Sec., Dep’t of Def., Address at
the NATO/CCMS Environmental Security Conference (May 20, 1997) (quoting Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright), in PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE NATO/CCMS ENVIRONMENTAL
SECURITY CONFERENCE, Sept. 1997, at 24.
3. Jonathan Margolis, Dep’t of State, Address at the NATO/CCMS Environmental
Security Conference (May 20, 1997), in PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE NATO/CCMS
ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY CONFERENCE, Sept. 1997, at 28.
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These considerations have important practical consequences for
the DoD’s development and implementation of overseas
environmental policies. First, environmental regulations at overseas
military bases and during operations protect the national security
interests of all U.S. citizens. Of particular importance, regulations
protect U.S. soldiers stationed overseas from environmental harms.
Not only do these soldiers deserve the same level of environmental
protection afforded soldiers on domestic bases, but those whose
health is adversely affected by environmental conditions overseas
may have diminished capacity to protect national security interests.
Second, foreign nations, in response to U.S. policies that aim to
respect and protect their natural resources, may provide the United
4
States increased access to overseas bases. Finally, acting in an
environmentally responsible manner may improve the United States’
5
image and facilitate relations with foreign nations.
The DoD’s current overseas environmental policies are
inadequate to effectively regulate the environmental consequences of
overseas military bases and operations. The DoD, for instance, has
implemented discrete policies concerning environmental assessment,
compliance, pollution prevention, and remediation that fail to provide
a coherent roadmap for environmental regulation overseas.
Furthermore, the DoD affords commanders a tremendous amount of
discretion in the implementation of these policies and provides for a
number of exemptions through which commanders may avoid
compliance.
The DoD’s failure to implement a coherent and enforceable set
of environmental policies has resulted in very real environmental
harms overseas. The United States maintained 823 sites in 39
6
countries in FY 2007 and has been involved in a number of overseas
operations, including those in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result of
the DoD’s failure to implement environmental policies that
adequately regulate overseas military bases, U.S. forces have
damaged the environments of host nations to such an extent that the

4. James E. Landis, The Domestic Implications of Environmental Stewardship at Overseas
Installations: A Look at Domestic Questions Raised by the United States’ Overseas
Environmental Policies, 49 NAVAL L. REV. 99, 101 (2002).
5. Id. at 102.
6. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY UNDER SEC’Y OF DEF., DEP’T OF DEF., BASE STRUCTURE
REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2007 BASELINE 6 (Sept. 30, 2006).
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costs for environmental cleanup and remediation of just one base
7
“could approach Superfund proportions.”
Furthermore, the lack of environmental regulations during
overseas operations has permitted open burn pits at bases in Iraq and
8
Afghanistan, which spew smoke containing known carcinogens. For
instance, at Balad Air Force Base in Iraq, commanders utilized jet
fuel in a burn pit—the sole means of trash disposal for four years—to
burn 500,000 pounds of trash per day, including plastics, food, and
9
medical wastes. In a still-classified study, the Chief of Aeromedical
Services stated that “the known carcinogens and respiratory
sensitizers released into the atmosphere by the burn pit present both
an acute and chronic health hazard to our troops and the local
10
populations.” In fact, many soldiers who have been exposed to the
11
burn pit have reported chronic cough and shortness of breath.
It is, therefore, clear that the DoD must improve its overseas
environmental regulations. Rather than a complete overhaul of the
DoD’s environmental regime, change should be effected through the
factors which influence current DoD policy: international
agreements, federal environmental statutes with extraterritorial
effect, and executive orders. Of these, the DoD is most likely to
improve its overseas environmental policies in response to an
executive order. International agreements have historically failed to
establish mandatory protections for the environments of foreign
countries. The requirements of the most applicable environmental
statutes, the National Environmental Policy Act and the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act, may not be applied extraterritorially to overseas
military bases.
The applicable executive orders currently in force, however, fail
to compel the DoD to implement adequate overseas environmental
regulations. I, therefore, propose an Executive Order that would
mandate environmental standards equivalent to those required
domestically, while allowing base commanders flexibility and

7. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MILITARY BASE CLOSURES: U.S. FINANCIAL
OBLIGATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES 27 (1992) (discussing the costs of cleanup and remediation
for U.S. bases in the Philippines) [hereinafter GAO BASE CLOSURES REPORT].
8. Adam Levine, Effects of Toxic Smoke Worry Troops Returning from Iraq, CNN.COM,
Dec. 15, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/12/15/burn.pits/index.html.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. Soldiers have named the resulting cough “Iraqi crud.” Id.

Laporte_Fmt5 .doc

206

2/12/2010 9:57:52 AM

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

Vol. 20:203

respecting the sovereignty of foreign nations. This Executive Order
would provide the DoD the standards necessary to implement an
overseas environmental policy that is truly protective of U.S. national
security and foreign policy interests.
II. CURRENT DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OVERSEAS
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
In response to executive orders, the highlighting of deficiencies
in the DoD’s overseas environmental management by the U.S.
12
General Accounting Office (GAO), and changing norms in
13
international environmental law, the DoD has implemented policies
regarding environmental assessment, compliance standards, pollution
prevention, and remediation at overseas bases and during military
operations. Although these policies reflect progress in the DoD’s
commitment to preventing and remedying environmental damage,
they are inadequate to compel commanders to enforce sufficient
environmental regulations. First, the DoD did not draft its policies as
a coherent environmental regime, but rather drafted its standards as
14
separate, yet parallel, to one another. This lack of coherence is
likely to engender confusion among commanders, thus decreasing the
standards’ effectiveness. Second, the policies prescribe the minimum
environmental standards to be implemented by commanders, but
provide no incentives for commanders to implement more rigid
15
standards.
Third, the DoD does not conduct sufficient oversight to ensure
that overseas bases and operations comply with its environmental
16
policies. In 1980, the Secretary of Defense assigned the primary
responsibility for ensuring that overseas military bases comply with
environmental laws and policies to base commanders, who may then
17
delegate this responsibility to another person or office. As a result,
according to the GAO, “there is no assurance that the bases are

12. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HAZARDOUS WASTE: MANAGEMENT
PROBLEMS CONTINUE AT OVERSEAS MILITARY BASES (1991) [hereinafter GAO HAZARDOUS
WASTE REPORT].
13. See discussion infra Part II.A.
14. See discussion infra Part II.A–D.
15. See Richard A. Phelps, Environmental Law for Overseas Installations, 40 A.F. L. REV.
49, 67 (1996).
16. GAO HAZARDOUS WASTE REPORT, supra note 12, at 8.
17. Id.
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18

properly [implementing environmental policies].” In its audit of the
management of overseas military bases’ environmental policy, for
example, the GAO reported that oversight by outside organizations
such as Inspector General offices, commands, and audit agencies was
19
limited. Furthermore, oversight on bases was “inadequate” due to
the poorly staffed and low-priority base operations charged with
20
overseeing environmental management.
Fourth, DoD environmental policies do not contain specific
21
sanctions for failure to comply with their requirements. Fifth, DoD
policies provide a number of loopholes through which commanders
may avoid environmental requirements, including broad exceptions
22
and ambiguous key terms and procedures for implementation.
Finally, neither Congress nor the DoD has sufficient oversight of
the funds devoted by military bases to environmental cleanup.
Rather than allocating funds to a separate account for the
implementation of environmental policies overseas, Congress has
appropriated overseas environmental funds as part of military bases’
23
account for operations and maintenance. Environmental protection
and remediation funds are pulled from the same account as funds
24
used, for example, to maintain aircraft, ships, tanks, and buildings.
As a result, neither Congress nor the DoD is able to determine
whether funds are being properly utilized for the implementation of
25
environmental policies or whether the current funding is sufficient.
As a result of these failures, the DoD’s current overseas
environmental policies concerning assessment, compliance, pollution
prevention, and remediation are inadequate to protect the
environments of foreign nations.

18. Id. at 12.
19. Id. at 16.
20. See id.
21. Phelps, supra note 15, at 74.
22. See discussion infra Part II.A–D.
23. Mark Hamilton, Assistant to the Assistant Deputy Sec’y of Def. for Overseas
Installations, Status of the U.S. Overseas Bases Program: Governmental Perspective (Oct. 25,
1999), in INST. OF POLICY STUDIES, THE INT’L GRASSROOTS SUMMIT ON MILITARY BASE
CLEANUP 3 (2000).
24. Id.
25. See id.
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A. Environmental Assessment
1. Executive Order 12114
On January 4, 1979, President Carter issued Executive Order
12114—Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions
(E.O. 12114), requiring federal agencies, including the DoD, to
26
consider the environmental effects of their actions abroad.
The
objective of the Order was to “provide information for use by
decisionmakers, to heighten awareness of and interest in
environmental concerns and, as appropriate, to facilitate
27
environmental cooperation with foreign nations.”
E.O. 12114
mandated a process that federal agencies must follow before taking
actions abroad but did not specify any substantive requirements. As
such, E.O. 12114 required that, when authorizing or approving
“major federal actions” that will significantly affect overseas
28
environments, agency decision makers must research, produce, and
take into consideration specified documents assessing the
29
environmental impact of their actions on the foreign nation.
Although E.O. 12114 furthered the goal of limiting
environmental harm caused by federal agencies abroad, the Order
included a number of exemptions which have been broadly
interpreted by federal agencies to limit their obligation to comply
with its requirements. For instance, in order for a foreign nation to
receive the benefits of the Order, it cannot have participated with the
United States or have been involved in the federal action significantly
30
affecting the environment.
The Order also allowed agencies to
modify the contents, timing, and availability of environmental
31
documents in a number of broadly defined circumstances.
2. Department of Defense Directive 6050.7
The DoD issued Directive 6050.7—Environmental Effects
Abroad of Major Department of Defense Actions to establish internal
procedures for the implementation of E.O. 12114 both at military

26. Exec. Order No. 12,114, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1979), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.S. § 4321 (2000)
[hereinafter E.O. 12114]. E.O. 12114 was still in force as of October 15, 2008. See 43 C.F.R. §
46.170 (2008).
27. Id. § 2-2.
28. Id. § 2-1.
29. See id. § 2-4(a).
30. Id. § 2-3(b).
31. Id. § 2-5(b).
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32

bases and during operations. The Directive defines key terms left
undefined by E.O. 12114 and details the documents that must be
produced and considered by DoD officials when authorizing or
approving “major federal actions that do significant harm to the
33
environment of places outside the United States.” Because E.O.
12114 failed to define the term “major action,” the DoD interpreted it
to mean that environmental assessments are only required for actions
“of considerable importance involving substantial expenditures of
time, money, and resources, that affect[] the environment on a large
geographic scale or ha[ve] substantial environmental effects on a
34
more limited geographical area . . . .”
Although the Directive purports to provide guidance on the
implementation of E.O. 12114, it leaves a tremendous amount of
discretion to base commanders to decide whether an environmental
35
assessment should be prepared and which of two specified forms it
36
The Directive does not provide any instruction
should take.
regarding which factors to consider when determining whether
environmental harm will be sufficiently “significant” for an
environmental assessment to be prepared. If the commander decides
that the harm will not be significant, the decision will be simply
37
recorded in a file. If the commander decides that harm will be
significant, no further action may be taken that would do “significant
harm to the environment” until an environmental assessment has
38
been completed and the results considered. Once these procedural
requirements have been satisfied, the Directive does not require that
the results of environmental assessments affect any substantive
aspects of military activities.
The DoD also took full advantage of the discretion granted by
E.O. 12114 to implement a number of exceptions which may be
utilized to justify failure to conduct an environmental assessment.
These exemptions are so broad that they “would likely provide
39
exempted status to most foreseeable overseas military operations.”
32. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NUMBER 6050.7: ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS ABROAD OF
MAJOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACTIONS § 1 (1979) [hereinafter DIRECTIVE 6050.7].
33. Id. §§ 1, 3, E2.3–.4.
34. Id. § 3.5.
35. See id. §§ 5.4.1, E2.4.3, E2.5.3.
36. See id. § E2.3.1.1.
37. Id. § E2.4.3, .5.3.
38. DIRECTIVE 6050.7, supra note 32, § E2.4.3, .5.3.
39. Richard M. Whitaker, Environmental Aspects of Overseas Operations: An Update, 1997
ARMY LAW. 17, 23 (1997).
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The Directive also incorporates E.O. 12114’s allowance for flexibility
in the preparation, content, and distribution of environmental
40
assessment documents. For example, the DoD reserves the right to
modify the documents’ requirements when necessary to avoid
infringement, or even the appearance of infringement, on the internal
41
affairs and sovereignty of another government.
42
Furthermore, consistent with E.O. 12114, environmental
assessments must only be conducted for “[m]ajor federal actions that
significantly harm the environment of a foreign nation that is not
43
involved in the action.” The Directive states that a foreign nation
may be involved through direct participation with the United States
in the environmentally harmful action, or through cooperation with
44
another nation participating in the harmful action. However, since
the Directive does not specify the level of participation necessary to
disqualify a foreign nation from receiving the benefits of an
environmental assessment, this provision has been broadly
interpreted to exclude any number of foreign nations where U.S.
45
armed forces were present.
The United States, for instance, utilized the broad “participating
nation exception” to avoid the requirement of conducting
environmental assessments during Operation Uphold Democracy in
46
Haiti in 1994.
The United States, under the authority of U.N.
47
Security Council Resolution 940, sent paratroopers to Haiti to oust
the illegitimate Cedras regime from power just as the regime agreed

40. See E.O. 12114, supra note 26, § 2-5(b).
41. DIRECTIVE 6050.7, supra note 32, § E2.4.6.3. The DoD appears to have had serious
concerns regarding infringement on the sovereignty of host countries under E.O. 12114. In
addition to this exemption, the Directive states that the DoD’s policy is to “act[] with care
within the jurisdiction of a foreign nation. Treaty obligations and the sovereignty of other
nations must be respected, and restraint must be exercised in applying United States laws within
foreign nations unless the Congress has expressly provided otherwise.” Id. § 4.3. The DoD thus
may have been concerned that the Order, issued by the President rather than by Congress,
applied U.S. environmental standards to foreign countries, and required invasive environmental
assessment procedures that may interfere with the sovereignty of host nations. See id. § 4.
42. See E.O. 12114, supra note 26, § 2-3(b).
43. DIRECTIVE 6050.7, supra note 32, § E2.2.1.1.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Karen V. Fair, Environmental Compliance in Contingency Operations: In
Search of a Standard?, 157 MIL. L. REV. 112, 131–34 (1998).
46. See id. at 133.
47. U.N. Security Council Resolution 940 authorized the creation of a multilateral force to
restore the legitimately elected President in Haiti. S.C. Res. 940, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940
(July 31, 1994).
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48

to relinquish control.
The United States considered the new
government of Haiti to be a “participating nation” and exempted it
49
from receiving environmental assessments.
Operation Uphold Democracy exemplifies how E.O. 12114 and
Directive 6050.7 may be interpreted broadly under circumstances in
which a country did not clearly participate in the action. Although
the new government of Haiti consented to the entry of U.S. forces
under a legitimate international agreement, it may not have
voluntarily agreed to host U.S. forces, but rather may have
50
capitulated to the coercion of a superpower and the United Nations.
Thus, under this exception, weaker countries may be legally coerced
into giving up their right to environmental assessments.
As a result of the discretion left to commanders and numerous
broad exemptions, for which E.O. 12114 clearly provided, complete
and fair implementation of E.O. 12114 at overseas military bases and
during operations cannot be guaranteed.
B. Environmental Compliance Standards
The DoD defined its substantive standards for environmental
compliance at overseas military bases through Instruction 4715.5—
Management of Environmental Compliance at Overseas Installations
51
(1996) and the Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance
52
Document (OEBGD) (2007). Instruction 4715.5 and the OEBGD
53
The DoD also
do not apply to overseas military operations.
explicitly stated that Instruction 4715.5 “does not apply to

48.
49.
50.
51.

Fair, supra note 45, at 131–32.
Id. at 131–33.
Whitaker, supra note 39, at 22.
DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NUMBER 4715.5: MANAGEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
COMPLIANCE AT OVERSEAS INSTALLATIONS (1996) [hereinafter INSTRUCTION 4715.5].
Instruction 4715.5 was implemented in response to the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1991, id. § 1.2, which directed the Secretary of Defense to “develop a policy for
determining the responsibilities of the Department of Defense with respect to cleaning up
environmental contamination that may be present at military installations located outside the
United States. In developing the policy, the Secretary shall take into account applicable
international agreements (such as Status of Forces agreements), multinational or joint use and
operation of such installations, relative share of the collective defense burden, and negotiated
accommodations.” National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 101510, § 342(b), 104 Stat. 1485, 1537–38 (1990).
52. OFFICE OF THE UNDER SEC’Y OF DEF. FOR ACQUISITION, TECH., AND LOGISTICS,
DEP’T OF DEF., OVERSEAS ENVIRONMENTAL BASELINE GUIDANCE DOCUMENT (2007)
[hereinafter OEBGD].
53. Id. § C1.3.3; INSTRUCTION 4715.5, supra note 51, § 2.1.4.
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54

environmental analyses conducted under E.O. 12114.” In doing so,
the DoD created a substantive compliance regime wholly separate
from the procedural requirements established in E.O. 12114 and
Directive 6050.7.
In fulfilling Instruction 4715.5’s substantive
compliance standards, commanders are therefore not required to
base their conduct on assessments under E.O. 12114.
Instruction 4715.5 mandated the creation of the OEBGD, a
document that specified the minimum substantive standards that
commanders must observe in developing environmental compliance
55
standards at overseas military bases. In mandating such standards,
the OEBGD took into consideration “generally accepted
environmental standards” applicable to military bases in the United
States and incorporated U.S. laws that may be applied
56
extraterritorially.
Instruction 4715.5 also provided for the development of Final
Governing Standards (FGS), which dictate country-specific
substantive environmental compliance standards for overseas military
57
bases.
The FGS for each host nation are determined by
Environmental Executive Agents (EEAs), who are appointed by the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Environmental Security
58
(DUSD(ES)).
EEAs are only appointed, and FGS only
promulgated, “in foreign countries where DoD installations are
located and where the DUSD(ES) determines that the level of DoD
59
presence justifies the establishment of FGS.”
Once appointed, the EEA must then determine country-specific
FGS based on the criteria and management practices mandated in the
60
OEBGD.
Instruction 4715.5 specifies that if host nation
environmental standards or international agreements provide more
protection “to human health and the environment” than the
OEBGD, the EEA should generally use the more protective
61
standards when developing the FGS. The EEA should, in all cases,

54. INSTRUCTION 4715.5, supra note 51, § 2.1.7.
55. Phelps, supra note 15, at 54–55; see also Hamilton, supra note 23, at 2 (noting that the
OEBGD provides commanders at overseas military bases a “major measuring stick to use to
begin to develop environmental programs”).
56. INSTRUCTION 4715.5, supra note 51, § 6.2.1.
57. Id. § 4.1.
58. Id. § 6.1.1.
59. Id.
60. Id. § 6.3.3.1; OEBGD, supra note 52, § C1.1.
61. INSTRUCTION 4715.5, supra note 51, § 6.3.3.1.
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comply with any international agreement with a host nation that
62
establishes a different standard. Once FGS are established in a host
nation, military base commanders in that nation are charged with
implementing policies to ensure compliance with the FGS’
63
substantive standards.
In host countries that the DUSD(ES) has determined do not
64
warrant FGS,
commanders must comply with applicable
65
international agreements, host nation environmental standards, and
66
the OEBGD. In cases of conflicting requirements, military bases
must comply with the requirement that is “more protective of human
67
health and the environment.”
Although Instruction 4715.5 and the OEBGD set essential
environmental compliance standards for U.S. bases in host nations, a
number of exceptions and funding requirements decrease their
effectiveness. First, the Instruction and the OEBGD do not apply to
the determination or remediation of environmental harm caused by
68
the DoD’s past activities.
Second, the OEBGD sets the minimum, not the ideal, standard
69
for environmental compliance.
Although Instruction 4715.5
provides for higher compliance standards if host nation
environmental laws or international agreements are more protective,
these circumstances are unlikely to occur in many host nations. Many
host nations do not have, or do not enforce, stringent environmental
70
regulations.
As the requirement to comply with host nation
standards has generally been interpreted, military bases must only
comply with standards to the extent that they are enforced by the host

62. Id.
63. Id. § 6.3.5 (“The DoD Components in a foreign nation for which FGS have been
established shall comply with the FGS established for that country.”).
64. See id. § 6.1.1.
65. Id. § 6.3.8. This requirement was implemented in response to President Carter’s 1978
Executive Order 12088—Federal Compliance with Pollution Control Standards, requiring that
“[t]he head of each Executive agency that is responsible for the construction or operation of
Federal facilities outside the United States shall ensure that such construction or operation
complies with the environmental pollution control standards of general applicability in the host
country or jurisdiction.” Exec. Order No. 12,088, 3 C.F.R. 243 § 1-801 (1979), reprinted in 42
U.S.C. § 4321 (2000).
66. INSTRUCTION 4715.5, supra note 51, § 6.3.8.
67. Id.
68. Id. § 2.1.6; OEBGD, supra note 52, § C1.3.5.
69. See Phelps, supra note 15, at 55.
70. GAO HAZARDOUS WASTE REPORT, supra note 12, at 12.
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71

country. For example, although water and air quality standards in
the Philippines are generally equivalent to U.S. standards, the
Philippine government does not enforce these laws against its citizens
or military bases. As a result, the United States does not recognize
72
the higher standards as binding.
Furthermore, unless specified in an agreement, the United States
has no legal obligation to comply with the host nations’
73
environmental laws. Most agreements between the United States
and host nations do not include specific provisions regarding
74
As a result, the
environmental protection or remediation.
OEBGD’s minimum standards govern the protection of most host
countries’ environments.
Additionally, many international
agreements between the United States and host nations release the
United States from any obligation to remediate or compensate
75
environmental damage.
Thus, even if a host nation’s laws are
protective of the environment, the EEA will base the nation’s FGS on
any agreements disclaiming U.S. liability for environmental harm
76
caused by its overseas military bases.
Third, both Instruction 4715.5 and the OEBGD contain a
number of exemptions. Specifically, neither document’s provisions
77
apply to core daily military operations, including off-base
78
operational and training deployments.
The Instruction and the
OEBGD state that such operations and deployments should be
conducted “in accordance with applicable international agreements,
other DoD Directives and Instructions and environmental annexes
79
incorporated into operation plans or operation orders.”
However, as exemplified in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia
in 1992, such guidance is inadequate during operational and training
71. GAO BASE CLOSURES REPORT, supra note 7, at 29.
72. Id.
73. See Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 256 (2d Cir. 2003).
74. Phelps, supra note 15, at 57.
75. See discussion infra Part III.A.1. These agreements are, at times, negotiated under a
power imbalance, in which host nations that are reliant upon the economic stimulus provided by
U.S. military bases feel pressured to make environmental concessions. Id.
76. See Hamilton, supra note 23, at 13 (“In terms of being required to follow host country
laws, I have to go back to the basic rules of the game for us, which is the SOFA. If the SOFA
says to [follow the host nation’s laws] and we agree to that, then we’ll do it. If the SOFA is
silent or addresses it in a different way, we don’t do it. We don’t have a legal requirement to do
it.”).
77. Landis, supra note 4, at 119.
78. INSTRUCTION 4715.5, supra note 51, § 2.1.4; OEBGD, supra note 52, § C1.3.3.
79. INSTRUCTION 4715.5, supra note 51, § 2.1.4; OEBGD, supra note 52, § C1.3.3.
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deployments. The DoD considered Operation Restore Hope to be
exempt from its environmental compliance policies, and, given the
“nature of the operation and the existing level of destruction in
[Somalia], environmental considerations were admittedly a ‘low
80
priority.’” In addition, Somalia lacked any form of local government
or regulatory system, leading to an absence of any environmental
controls. Although U.S. forces prepared an environmental annex, it
81
was largely neglected.
Operation Restore Hope, therefore,
demonstrates how the DoD’s environmental compliance policy
containing broad discretion and exemptions is grossly inadequate to
provide environmental protection to both the foreign country and
82
U.S. troops during operations.
Finally, the DoD does not specify requirements for prioritizing
the funding of environmental compliance standards in the FGS or
83
OEBGD under any but the most dire circumstances. Instruction
4715.5 states only that funding for environmental compliance
requirements should be determined according to “risk-based
prioritization, based on local circumstances and long-term
84
objectives.” Furthermore, when a host nation agrees to release the
United States from liability for environmental damage in an
international agreement, military bases are not authorized to expend
85
funds or other resources to address environmental harms.
Commanders can thus easily justify not allocating sufficient, or any,
funds to environmental compliance.
C. Pollution Prevention
Unlike the DoD’s regimes concerning environmental assessment
and compliance, the DoD’s compliance and pollution prevention
regimes are related. Instruction 4715.5 and the OEBGD specify that
compliance standards should be attained primarily through pollution
prevention, so long as prevention is “economically advantageous and
86
consistent with mission requirements.”
The DoD created its
pollution prevention regime through Instruction 4715.4—Pollution

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Fair, supra note 45, at 129 (citation omitted).
Id. at 130.
See id. at 130–31.
See INSTRUCTION 4715.5, supra note 51, § 6.5.2.
Id. § 6.5.2.4.
Id. § 6.5.3.
INSTRUCTION 4715.5, supra note 51, § 4.3.
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Prevention (1996) and the OEBGD (2007).
Instruction 4715.4
88
provides “additional pollution prevention guidance” through
89
procedural requirements that are to be applied in a manner
90
consistent with Instruction 4715.5’s substantive requirements, while
the OEBGD establishes substantive pollution standards for overseas
91
military bases.
Although Instruction 4715.4 does not include the same number
of broad exemptions as the DoD’s environmental assessment and
compliance policies, its initiatives are tempered by the constant
reminder that they are to be implemented “in the most economical
92
93
manner,” or only “where cost effective.” Given that commanders
have the discretion to determine whether pollution prevention
measures are economically feasible, such provisions provide an easy
means of avoiding the implementation of pollution prevention
programs.
D. Environmental Remediation
1. Department of Defense Instruction 4715.8
Instruction 4715.8—Environmental Remediation for DoD
Activities Overseas (1998) sets forth the DoD’s policies regarding
remediation of environmental contamination caused by the DoD
94
both on and off overseas military bases. The Instruction explicitly
states that these policies do not apply to the substantive
environmental requirements issued under Instruction 4715.5 and the
95
OEBGD. The Instruction, therefore, creates a remediation regime
separate from compliance standards.
The Instruction requires that EEAs, as designated in Instruction
4715.5 on compliance standards, establish country-specific
remediation policies, which should, among other requirements: (1)

87. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NUMBER 4715.4: POLLUTION PREVENTION (1996)
[hereinafter INSTRUCTION 4715.4].
88. INSTRUCTION 4715.5, supra note 51, § 6.7.
89. See generally INSTRUCTION 4715.4, supra note 87.
90. Id. § 2.2.
91. See Phelps, supra note 15. See generally INSTRUCTION 4715.5, supra note 51; OEBGD,
supra note 52.
92. INSTRUCTION 4715.4, supra note 87, § 6.2.3.1.
93. Id. § 6.2.3.3.1,.2.
94. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NUMBER 4715.8: ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION FOR
DOD ACTIVITIES OVERSEAS § 2.1.2, .3 (1998) [hereinafter INSTRUCTION 4715.8].
95. Id. § 2.2.1.
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define the appropriate level of remediation at contaminated sites, and
(2) establish procedures for negotiating remedial measures with the
96
host nation. Base commanders must then remedy environmental
contamination to the extent required under Instruction 4715.8 and the
97
country-specific standards established by the EEAs.
Instruction 4715.8 specifies procedures that must be followed to
effect remediation.
Such procedures depend on whether the
contamination occurred at overseas military bases that are “open and
98
have not been designated for return” to the host country, at bases
99
that “have been designated for return or that are already returned,”
100
or outside of overseas military bases.
Under all circumstances,
however, overseas base commanders are required to take “prompt
action” only when remedying “known imminent and substantial
endangerments to human health and safety that are due to
101
environmental contamination that was caused by DoD operations.”
Remediation under Instruction 4715.8 is inherently limited by its
terms.
First, in order to warrant any remediation at all,
102
environmental contamination must be “known.” Commanders are
thus under no obligation to foresee dangers, and, in fact, have an
incentive not to conduct studies to determine the future
environmental impacts of their activities.
Second, Instruction 4715.8 severely limits the circumstances
under which it will apply. For instance, although the Instruction
applies to current DoD operations, it does not apply to operations
“connected with actual or threatened hostilities, security assistance
103
programs, peacekeeping missions, or relief operations.”
The
Instruction also does not apply to “[a]ctions to remedy environmental
contamination that are covered by requirements in environmental
104
annexes to operation orders . . . .”
Third, the DoD failed to set adequate assessment criteria and
remediation standards. Instruction 4715.8 does not provide any
criteria for commanders to assess whether environmental

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. § 4.2.3.1.
Id. § 4.2.1.
Id. § 5.1.
Id. § 5.2.
INSTRUCTION 4715.8, supra note 94, § 5.3.1.
Id. § 5.1.1, .2.1, .3.1.
Id. § 5.1.1.
Id. § 2.1.3.
Id. § 2.2.1.
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105

contamination presents “imminent and substantial endangerment.”
Given the restrictive nature of the phrase, commanders can likely
exclude the vast majority of environmental issues. Furthermore, the
Instruction failed to define adequate remediation standards.
Environmental contamination need only be remedied to the point
that it does not pose “imminent and substantial endangerment to
106
human health, environment, and safety.” Given the immediacy and
urgency implicit in this phrase, commanders are not obligated to
implement high levels of remediation. Commanders, in fact, are
given the flexibility to order such little remedial action as restricting
107
access to contaminated areas. While protecting human health and
safety in the short term (as implied by the term “imminent”), such
action would hardly safeguard the host nation’s environment and
108
people from the ill-effects of such contamination in the future.
Fourth, it may be difficult to determine when the DoD “caused”
environmental contamination in host nations.
As with the
“participating nation exception” to E.O. 12114 and Directive 6050.7,
the line between action that was clearly taken by the DoD and action
that was taken with the consent, or participation, of the host nation
109
may not be clear.
If the host nation approved of, or in any way
participated in, the action causing environmental contamination, the
DoD can claim that it did not “cause” the contamination and avoid
the obligation to remediate it.
Finally, neither Congress nor the DoD has allocated additional
funds for remediation. The Instruction provides that the remediation
110
requirements are to apply, “subject to the availability of funds.”
Since the funds that Congress allocates for the DoD’s environmental
overseas policies are pulled from the same account as the funds for
111
operations and maintenance of overseas military bases, remediation
projects must compete with operations and maintenance projects for
112
financing.
Given the broad discretion Instruction 4715.8 affords
113
base commanders in approving remediation programs, and given

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See id. § 5.1.1, .2.1, .3.1.
INSTRUCTION 4715.8, supra note 94, § 5.4.3.
Id.
See id.
See infra Part II.A.2.
Id. § 5.
Hamilton, supra note 23, at 3.
Phelps, supra note 15, at 81.
See supra notes 105–108 and accompanying text.
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the lack of transparency and oversight inherent in the combined
environmental programs, operations and maintenance projects
114
account, it is unlikely that commanders would pull funds from other
operations and maintenance programs in order to fund any but the
most urgent environmental remediation projects.
Although remediation at bases that are open and not scheduled
for return to host countries, and at areas outside of bases, is limited
115
only by the general requirements above, remediation at bases that
have been designated for return or that are already returned is
minimized by additional limitations. First, remediation may be
completed after the return of a base to the host nation; however, it
must be limited to specifications detailed in a remediation plan
116
The
approved by the commander before the base’s return.
Instruction does not provide any standards which commanders must
117
follow in approving or denying the remediation plan. Remediation,
therefore, is limited by the need to prepare a plan and obtain the base
commander’s approval in advance.
Second, after the military base is returned to the host nation, the
DoD may not fund any remediation beyond that required by a
binding international agreement or under an approved remediation
118
plan, as described above.
Because most international agreements
do not include specific provisions regarding environmental
119
remediation, the United States is generally under no obligation to
120
Host nations are
comply if the host nation requests remediation.
121
thus compelled to perform additional remediation, identify the
contamination “as an offset against the residual value of DoD capital
122
improvements,” or make claims under relevant provisions, if any, of
123
the applicable international agreement to regain remediation costs.

114. See Hamilton, supra note 23, at 3.
115. See INSTRUCTION 4715.8, supra note 94, § 5.1, .3.
116. Id. § 5.2.1.
117. See id.
118. Id. § 5.2.3.3.
119. Phelps, supra note 15, at 57.
120. See id. at 80; Hamilton, supra note 23, at 8 (“In the way the thing is working, when we
leave the facility, in the absence of some agreement which specifically says we have activities to
take, it’s over. . . . In the Philippines . . . the United States closed their facilities, left their
facilities, the host country took those facilities and that was the end of it.”).
121. See, e.g., INSTRUCTION 4715.8, supra note 94, § 5.1.4.
122. Id. § 5.5.
123. Phelps, supra note 15, at 80.
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2. Final Governing Standards
Although FGS, as determined by the OEBGD, do not generally
apply to remediation of environmental problems caused by the
124
DoD’s “past activities,” the OEBGD provides for remediation in
125
response to spills and leaks from underground storage tanks. The
OEBGD, for instance, instructs overseas military bases to create a
Spill Prevention and Response Plan, including measures to prevent,
and, “to the maximum extent practicable,” to remove, a “worst case
discharge” of hazardous substances and refined petroleum, oil, and
126
lubricant (POL) spills. If hazardous wastes leak or spill in any way,
127
the base must contain “visible releases to the environment.”
The OEBGD fails, however, to provide substantive standards for
remediation. For cleanup of hazardous substances and POL spills
128
from underground storage tanks, the OEBGD focuses on an
ambiguous notion of containment, rather than on substantive
129
remediation standards.
After an undefined initial response has
been completed, for instance, any remaining pollutants and
“obviously contaminated soil” must be “appropriately removed and
130
managed” according to Instruction 4715.8. Although the OEBGD
provides the most specific remediation standards for leaks or spills of
hazardous wastes, it again fails to provide any substantive standards
for remediation.
The limitations of Instruction 4715.8 and the OEBGD thus have
a detrimental effect on a host nation’s ability to obtain remediation
for environmental contamination caused by the DoD.
III. FACTORS INFLUENCING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
Given that current DoD policy is inadequate to fully address
environmental concerns at overseas military bases and during
operations, change must be effected through factors that influence
DoD policy. In formulating its policies, the DoD considers: (1)

124. OEBGD, supra note 52, § C1.3.5.
125. Phelps, supra note 15, at 77–78.
126. OEBGD, supra note 52, § C18.3.1. A “worst case discharge” is “[t]he largest
foreseeable discharge from the facility.” Id. § C18.2.9.
127. Id. § C6.3.7.6.2.
128. See id. § C18.3.3.
129. See id. § C18.1.
130. Id. § C18.3.6.
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131

international agreements; (2) federal environmental statutes with
132
133
extraterritorial effect; and (3) executive orders.
The DoD, however, is most likely to significantly improve its
overseas environmental policy in response to executive orders.
Historically, international agreements have failed to provide
protection for the environment of host nations, at times even
including provisions disclaiming U.S. liability for the environmental
harms it causes. Additionally, the requirements of the most
applicable federal statutes, the National Environmental Policy Act
134
(NEPA)
and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
135
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), cannot be applied
extraterritorially to regulate environmental harm overseas, as neither
136
statute overcomes the presumption against extraterritoriality.
Executive orders, on the other hand, have been shown to effect
137
changes in DoD overseas environmental policy. Furthermore, the
President has unquestionable constitutional authority to issue
138
executive orders concerning the DoD.
Thus, an executive order
must be utilized in order to effect improvements in the DoD’s
overseas environmental policy.
A. International Agreements
1. Status of Forces Agreements and Basing Agreements
DoD policy regarding the determination of FGS, pollution
prevention, and remediation is dictated, in part, by applicable
131. See, e.g., INSTRUCTION 4715.5, supra note 51, § 4.1 (considering international
agreements in creating FGS); INSTRUCTION 4715.4, supra note 87, § 4.1.1 (“It is DoD policy to:
Ensure . . . installations located outside the United States [comply] with applicable . . .
international agreements . . . .”); INSTRUCTION 4715.8, supra note 94, § 5.1.3 (“International
agreements may also require the United States to fund environmental remediation.”).
132. See, e.g., OEBGD, supra note 52, § C1.4.5.1 (incorporating federal environmental
statutes with extraterritorial effect); INSTRUCTION 4715.4, supra note 87, § 4.1.1 (“It is DoD
policy to: Ensure . . . installations located outside the United States [comply] with applicable . . .
Federal statutes with extraterritorial effect . . . .”).
133. See, e.g., DIRECTIVE 6050.7, supra note 32, § 1 (implementing E.O. 12114);
INSTRUCTION 4715.5, supra note 51, § 4.1 (implementing Executive Order 12088); INSTRUCTION
4715.4, supra note 87, § 4.1.1 (“It is DoD policy to: Ensure . . . installations located outside the
United States [comply] with applicable Executive Orders . . . .”).
134. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321–4370 (2006).
135. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601–9675 (2006).
136. See infra Part III.B.
137. See infra Part III.C.
138. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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139

international agreements.
These agreements impose legal
obligations, similar to contractual obligations, on the United States
140
and other parties to the agreements.
Generally, such agreements
are in the form of Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), which
define the legal status of U.S. military personnel and property in host
141
nations; or basing agreements, which define rights and obligations
142
arising from the use of military bases in a host country.
Although some of the more developed host countries are
beginning to propose terms that would provide guidelines for
environmental protection or remediation, the vast majority of
international agreements signed by the United States do not define
143
environmental compliance standards.
Some agreements contain
claims that are sufficiently broad to cover injuries to people or
property due to environmental contamination caused by U.S.
144
forces; however, the agreements do not provide for environmental
protection or remediation and generally include provisions which
limit the ability of host nation claimants to recover for environmental
145
damage.
The 1947 basing agreement between the United States and the
Philippines, for instance, stated that the United States would provide
“reasonable compensation” for claims arising from harm to property
146
or people caused by U.S. armed forces. Although this provision was
likely broad enough to encompass environmental damage, the ability
of Philippine claimants to receive compensation was limited in several
important ways, including that claims must have been presented
within one year after the occurrence of the incident leading to the
147
claim. Claimants were thus foreclosed from recovering for injuries
139. See supra note 131.
140. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 256 (2d Cir. 2003).
141. GlobalSecurity.org, Status-of-Forces Agreement [SOFA],
http://www. globalsecurity.org/military/ facility/sofa.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2008).
142. See, e.g., Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of the
Philippines Concerning Military Bases, U.S.-Phil., Mar. 14, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1,775 [hereinafter
Philippines Basing Agreement].
143. See Phelps, supra note 15, at 57–58.
144. Id. at 57.
145. See id. at 57–58.
146. Philippines Basing Agreement, supra note 142, art. XXIII. The 1947 Philippines
Basing Agreement expired in 1991, and the Philippine Senate rejected a treaty that would have
extended its terms. DAVID S. SORENSON, MILITARY BASE CLOSURE: A REFERENCE
HANDBOOK 116 (2007).
147. Philippines Basing Agreement, supra note 142, art. XXIII; GAO BASE CLOSURES
REPORT, supra note 7, at 29.
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resulting from environmental damage that did not manifest
148
themselves for longer periods of time.
Furthermore, many agreements either relieve the United States
of any obligation to remediate environmental damage or include a
149
waiver for claims arising from damage to the host nation’s property.
The SOFA between the United States and Japan, for instance,
provides that “[t]he United States is not obliged, when it returns
facilities and areas to Japan . . . to restore the facilities and areas to
the condition in which they were at the time they became available to
the United States armed forces, or to compensate Japan in lieu of
150
such restoration.” The 1947 basing agreement between the United
States and the Philippines also provided that “[t]he United States is
not obligated to turn over the bases to the Philippines . . . in the
151
condition in which they were at the time of their occupation . . . .”
Finally, the SOFA between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), of which the United States is a member,
provides that each party “waives all its claims against any other
Contracting Party for damage to any property owned by it and used
152
by its land; sea or air armed services . . . .” As a result, many host
nations have either disclaimed their right to enforce environmental
remediation standards, or have agreed to waive any claims for
153
damages resulting from environmental harm caused by the DoD.
The United States thus has a long history of entering into SOFAs
or basing agreements that fail to provide meaningful environmental
protections for host nations. Given that the United States often
enters into agreements with host nations which are much less
powerful, and which may not value environmental protection, or
which may concede environmental compliance and remediation
standards in favor of the economic benefits provided by U.S. military

148. Philippines Basing Agreement, supra note 142, art. XXIII; GAO BASE CLOSURES
REPORT, supra note 7, at 29.
149. Phelps, supra note 15, at 82.
150. Agreement Under Article IV of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security
Between the United States of America and Japan, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the
Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan, U.S.-Japan, art. IV, Jan. 19, 1960, 11 U.S.T.
1652.
151. Philippines Basing Agreement, supra note 142, art. XVII, para. 2; see also GAO BASE
CLOSURES REPORT, supra note 7, at 29 (analyzing the Philippines Basing Agreement).
152. Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of
Their Forces art. VIII, para. 1, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, 199 U.N.T.S. 67; see also Phelps,
supra note 15, at 82 (describing the NATO SOFA).
153. See Phelps, supra note 15, at 57–58.
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bases, the majority of international agreements are not likely to
include clauses providing definite standards for environmental
compliance and remediation. Without such standards, commanders
have few incentives to provide adequate environmental protection
and remediation.
It is, therefore, unlikely that changes to the DoD’s overseas
environmental policy will be effected through international
agreements.
2. Customary International Law
It is often argued that the United States, in failing to prevent and
remedy environmental harms at overseas military bases and during
operations, is violating a duty under customary international law not
154
to harm the environment of other nations. This principle has been
most famously articulated in the Trail Smelter Case regarding
155
transboundary air pollution between the United States and Canada.
There, the Special Arbitral Tribunal found that “no State has the
right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to
cause injury . . . in or to the territory of another or the properties or
156
persons therein . . . .”
The International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) has also issued several
opinions indicating its approval of this obligation. In the 1949 Corfu
Channel Case, for instance, the I.C.J. found that it was “every State’s
obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts
157
contrary to the rights of other States.”
More recently, in its 1996
advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, the I.C.J. noted that “[t]he existence of the general
obligation of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction
and control respect the environment of other States or of areas
beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law
158
relating to the environment.”

154. See, e.g., Kim David Chanbonpin, Comment, Holding the United States Accountable for
Environmental Damages Caused by the U.S. Military in the Philippines, a Plan for the Future, 4
ASIAN-PACIFIC L. & POL’Y J. 245, 280–83 (2003); J. Martin Wagner & Neil A.F. Popovic,
Environmental Injustice on United States Bases in Panama: International Law and the Right to
Land Free from Contamination and Explosives, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 401, 439–42 (1998).
155. Wagner & Popovic, supra note 154, at 440.
156. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int’l Arb. Awards 1905, 1965 (1941).
157. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9).
158. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
241–42, para. 29 (July 8).
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The United Nations has convened several conferences resulting
in multilateral affirmation of this obligation. Principle 21 of the 1972
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment (Stockholm Declaration) declared that “[s]tates
have . . . the responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of
159
other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”
Subsequently, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development (Rio Declaration) reaffirmed the Stockholm
Declaration and restated Principle 21 in the context of sustainable
160
development.
The overseas environmental policy of the DoD violates the
principle that a nation’s activities should not cause environmental
harm to other states. Yet, though this principle should be morally
binding, it is not legally binding under norms of customary
international law. Customary international law “is composed only of
those rules that States universally abide by, or accede to, out of a
161
sense of legal obligation and mutual concern.” The United States
recognizes that customary international law creates legal obligations
among States; however, federal courts are only required to “take
judicial notice of, and to give effect to” rules of customary
international law in the absence of an applicable treaty or domestic
162
statute, judicial decision, or executive act.
As such, the decisions of the Special Arbitral Tribunal and the
I.C.J. do not create legal obligations binding on the DoD’s
environmental policies. The Special Arbitral Tribunal’s decision in
the Trail Smelter Case, for instance, is only binding on the United
States and Canada with respect to that particular case, and does not
create obligations with respect to third parties. The United States
and Canada convened the Special Arbitral Tribunal by Special
Agreement, signifying their consent to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and

159. United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5–16,
1972, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, part II, para.
21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1 (June 16, 1972), available at http://
www.unep.org/Law/PDF/Stockholm_Declaration.pdf [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
160. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz.,
June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, para. 2, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26
(Aug.
12,
1992),
available
at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm
[hereinafter
Rio
Declaration].
161. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 248 (2d Cir. 2003).
162. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 707 (1900).
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163

to be bound by its decision.
Because other states did not submit
themselves to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the United States
cannot be obligated to comply with the Tribunal’s decision in its
relations with them. Furthermore, the United States and Canada
consented to be bound to the Tribunal’s decision, but only with
respect to that case. For this reason, in a subsequent treaty with
Canada regarding transboundary air pollution, the United States
noted only a “tradition of environmental cooperation as reflected
in . . . the Trail Smelter Arbitration of 1941,” but did not refer to the
164
decision as binding law. The Trail Smelter Case, therefore, does not
impose obligations on the United States with respect to the effects of
its environmental policies on third parties.
Similarly, the I.C.J. is not “empowered to create binding norms
165
of customary international law.” Under Article 59 of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice, decisions such as Corfu Channel
“[have] no binding force except between the parties and in respect of
166
that particular case.”
Additionally, advisory opinions, as on the
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, are, by definition,
167
advisory, and do not constitute binding international law.
Furthermore, U.S. courts have determined that the United
Nations’ Stockholm and Rio Declarations did not create a norm of
customary international law binding on the United States. The
Second Circuit, in Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., explicitly
recognized that the Rio, and, by implication, the Stockholm,
Declarations did not evidence customary international law with which
168
the United States was obligated to comply.
“Such declarations,”
according to the court, “are almost invariably political statements—
expressing the . . . aspirations and demands of some countries or
organizations—rather than statements of universally-recognized legal
169
Specifically, the Rio Declaration expressed
obligations.”
“boundless and indeterminate” principles that were “devoid of

163. See generally Special Agreement: Convention for Settlement of Difficulties Arising
from Operation of Smelter at Trail, B.C., U.S.-Can., Apr. 15, 1935, U.S.T.S. No. 893.
164. See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Canada on Air Quality, U.S.-Can., para. 8, Mar. 13, 1991, T.I.A.S. No. 11,783
[hereinafter U.S.-Canada Treaty].
165. Flores, 414 F.3d at 263.
166. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 59, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055.
167. See id. art. 65.
168. See Flores, 414 F.3d at 262.
169. Id.
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170

articulable or discernable standards and regulations,” and did not
include any language “indicating that the [nations] joining in the
171
Declaration intended to be legally bound by it.” Since the Rio, and,
by implication, the Stockholm, Declarations did not create any
enforceable legal obligations, they “do not provide reliable evidence
172
of customary international law.”
Thus, although the DoD’s overseas environmental policy should
not, in the spirit of international cooperation and environmental
protection, violate this principle, the DoD is not bound by customary
international law to ensure that its policies do not cause
environmental harm to other States.
B. Federal Statutes with Extraterritorial Effect
The DoD requires that EEAs and commanders consider
applicable federal statutes with extraterritorial effect in developing
173
FGS under Instruction 4715.5 and the OEBGD. Two of the most
174
important federal environmental statutes are NEPA
and
175
NEPA, for instance, effects pollution prevention by
CERCLA.
aiming to influence decision-makers in the DoD to consider solutions
176
that would prevent, or minimize, environmental harm.
Additionally, CERCLA imposes liability for environmental
177
The DoD would thus likely
contamination caused by the DoD.
consider NEPA and CERCLA as federal statutes that are
“applicable” to its environmental policy at military bases overseas.
NEPA and CERCLA, however, do not meet the DoD’s
requirement that statutes must have extraterritorial effect. In order
for a federal statute to control activities overseas, it must overcome a
178
strong “presumption against extraterritoriality.”
Since NEPA and
CERCLA do not meet the requirements to overcome this

170. Id. at 255 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
171. Id. at 263.
172. See id.
173. See supra note 132.
174. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370 (2006).
175. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006).
176. See Wagner & Popovic, supra note 154, at 427.
177. See id. at 428.
178. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S.
244, 248 (1991).
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presumption, their mandates cannot dictate DoD environmental
policies overseas.
1. The Applicability of NEPA and CERCLA to the Department
of Defense’s Overseas Environmental Policy
a. NEPA
NEPA is considered to be the cornerstone of environmental
179
protection under federal law. Congress enacted NEPA in 1969 to
“declare a national policy which will encourage productive and
enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote
efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment . . .
and stimulate the health and welfare of man; [and] to enrich the
understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources
180
important to the Nation . . . .”
NEPA does not dictate policy or establish substantive standards
for environmental regulation, but rather mandates procedures to
ensure that federal agencies incorporate into their decision-making
181
processes the environmental effects of proposed actions.
Section
102(2)(C) of NEPA thus requires all federal agencies, including the
DoD, that are planning “major Federal actions significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment” to assess the environmental
182
impact of the proposed actions. If the assessment indicates that the
proposed action will significantly impact the environment, agencies
183
must then prepare a “detailed statement,”
known as an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), reporting the results of their
184
The purpose of the EIS is to inform decision-makers so
findings.
that they may “avoid or minimize” the adverse environmental
185
impacts of their decisions wherever possible.
b. CERCLA
Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 “in response to the serious
186
environmental and health risks posed by industrial pollution.”

179. Wagner & Popovic, supra note 154, at 427.
180. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006).
181. Envtl. Def. Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 532 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
183. Id.
184. Wagner & Popovic, supra note 154, at 427.
185. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2(e) (2008).
186. Arc Ecology v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 411 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2005)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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CERCLA’s primary objectives were “to ensure the prompt and
effective cleanup of waste disposal sites, and to assure that parties
responsible for hazardous substances [bear] the cost of remedying the
187
conditions they created.”
CERCLA is not a regulatory statute, but rather imposes liability
on responsible parties for environmental contamination. CERCLA
specifies that any covered party, including federal agencies such as
188
the DoD, is liable for: (1) the costs of investigation and assessment
189
of any “release” or “substantial threat” of release of hazardous
substances or contaminants which may present “an imminent and
”190
substantial danger to the public health or welfare; (2) the costs of
removal or remediation of the contamination; and (3) damages for
191
harm to natural resources.
Once it is determined that there has been a release, or that there
is a threat of release, CERCLA mandates removal, remedial action,
or abatement when the release poses an “imminent and substantial
192
endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment.”
CERCLA specifies that “remedial actions in which treatment
permanently and significantly” reduces contaminants should “be
193
preferred over remedial actions not involving such treatment.”
Remedial actions are complete when they “attain a degree of cleanup
and . . . control of further release” that, at the very least, “assures
194
protection of human health and the environment.”
2. The Extraterritorial Application of NEPA and CERCLA
Federal courts have made it fairly clear, however, that NEPA
and CERCLA may not be applied extraterritorially to govern
195
environmental policy at overseas military bases.
Courts have
187. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
188. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (2006) (stating that the term “person” includes the U.S.
Government).
189. “Release means any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying,
discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment . . . .” Id.
§ 9601(22).
190. Id. § 9604(a)(1).
191. Id. § 9607(a).
192. Id. § 9604(a)(1); 9606(a).
193. Id. § 9621(b)(1).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(1).
195. “Extraterritoriality” is defined as a “jurisdictional concept concerning the authority of a
nation to . . . establish the norms of conduct applicable to events or persons outside its borders.”
Massey, 986 F.2d at 530.
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enunciated a “longstanding principle . . . that legislation of Congress,
unless a contrary intent appears, is [presumed] to apply only within
196
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”
The primary
purpose of this presumption against extraterritoriality is to protect
against conflicts between federal laws and those of other States which
197
could adversely affect international relations.
There are, however, three categories of cases in which the
presumption against extraterritoriality will not apply: (1) where
Congress has clearly expressed an “affirmative intention” to apply the
198
statute extraterritorially, as determined, in part, by consideration of
199
the foreign policy implications of extraterritorial application; (2)
where failure to apply the statute to a foreign setting would “result in
adverse effects within the United States;” or (3) where “the conduct
200
regulated by the government occurs within the United States.”
Because neither NEPA nor CERCLA satisfies the exceptions to
the presumption against extraterritorially, change in DoD overseas
environmental policy cannot be effected through the extraterritorial
application of these statutes.
a. Congressional Intent
NEPA and CERCLA may be applied extraterritorially to
overseas military bases if Congress has expressed an “affirmative
201
intention” to do so. Congress has the authority to enforce its laws
202
overseas. However, courts assume that Congress legislates under a
203
presumption against extraterritoriality. Therefore, unless Congress
clearly expresses its intent to give a statute extraterritorial effect,
courts assume that Congress intended the legislation to apply
204
domestically.

196. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S.
244, 248 (1991) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
197. Id.
198. Massey, 986 F.2d at 531 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
199. See Arc Ecology, 411 F.3d at 1094; Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749, 759 (D.
Haw. 1990).
200. Massey, 986 F.2d at 531 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
201. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
202. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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i. NEPA
Although NEPA’s language indicates that Congress was
concerned with both domestic and global environmental problems, it
does not state clearly whether Congress intended NEPA to apply
extraterritorially.
Congress indicated its concern for global
environmental issues, for instance, in section 102(2)(F) of NEPA,
which directed federal agencies to “recognize the worldwide and
205
long-range character of environmental problems.”
Additionally,
section 2 states Congress’ intention that NEPA will “encourage
productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his
206
environment,” not just between man and the national environment.
Congress, however, limited the extraterritorial implications of its
previous statements by making clear that any actions taken in
furtherance of international environmental cooperation must be
207
“consistent with the foreign policy of the United States.”
Furthermore, NEPA’s legislative history provides no indication
208
whether Congress contemplated extraterritorial application.
Congress’ intention regarding the extraterritorial application of
209
NEPA is thus “obscure.”
As a result of Congress’ conflicting statements, courts have
declined to decide whether NEPA may be given extraterritorial
effect, instead limiting their decisions to the facts of the cases before
them.
Courts, therefore, “must determine whether Congress
intended NEPA to apply under circumstances such as these and
whether, under the unique facts presented, defendants have violated
NEPA by failing to prepare a comprehensive EIS for actions
210
taken . . . within a foreign country . . . .”
The determination of
whether Congress intended NEPA to apply extraterritorially must
also take into consideration the foreign policy implications of
211
extraterritorial application under those circumstances.
If applying
NEPA extraterritorially would threaten U.S. foreign policy, courts

205. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F) (2006); Browne C.
Lewis, It’s a Small World After All: Making the Case for the Extraterritorial Application of the
National Environmental Policy Act, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 2143, 2169 (2004).
206. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (emphasis added); Lewis, supra note 205, at 2169.
207. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F).
208. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n (NRDC v. NRC), 647 F.2d
1345, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Robinson, J., concurring in the judgment).
209. Id.
210. Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749, 759 (D. Haw. 1990).
211. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F) (stating that agency actions overseas must be
“consistent with the foreign policy of the United States”).
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presume that Congress did not intend NEPA to apply
212
extraterritorially in that case.
Given that NEPA’s statutory language and legislative history do
not clearly state congressional intent, courts have largely considered
the U.S. foreign policy implications of applying NEPA
213
extraterritorially to be determinative. In Natural Resources Defense
Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRDC v. NRC), for
example, the D.C. Circuit considered whether the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission was required to prepare an EIS prior to
214
In determining
exporting a nuclear reactor to the Philippines.
whether Congress intended NEPA to be applied extraterritorially to
environmental impacts in the Philippines, the court concluded that,
within the context of nuclear technology exports, imposition of U.S.
standards on foreign nations would adversely affect U.S.
nonproliferation objectives, as nations may be deterred from
215
purchasing reliable nuclear technologies from the United States.
Therefore, Congress did not intend for NEPA to impose an EIS
requirement on nuclear export decisions with respect to
216
environmental impacts occurring solely within foreign jurisdictions.
The D.C. Circuit adopted a different approach in Environmental
217
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey.
The Environmental Defense Fund
alleged “that the National Science Foundation (NSF) [had] violated
NEPA by failing to prepare an [EIS] in accordance with section
102(2)(C) before going forward with plans to incinerate food wastes
218
in Antarctica.” In determining whether Congress intended NEPA
to apply extraterritorially to actions in Antarctica, the court held that
the presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply where “the
alleged extraterritorial effect of the statute will be felt in Antarctica—

212. See Greenpeace USA, 748 F. Supp. at 759 (“[T]he court must take into consideration
the foreign policy implications of applying NEPA within a foreign nation’s borders.”).
213. See id.
214. NRDC v. NRC, 647 F.2d at 1346–48.
215. See id. at 1347–48.
216. Id.; see also Greenpeace USA, 748 F. Supp. at 760–61 (holding that, because requiring
the U.S. Army to prepare an EIS before removing an arms stockpile from West Germany would
result in timing delays that would violate substantive provisions of an agreement negotiated
between the President and West Germany, and because environmental assessment would
violate West Germany’s sovereignty, Congress did not intend NEPA to apply to the movement
of munitions through West Germany).
217. Massey, 986 F.2d at 528.
218. Id. at 529.
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a continent without a sovereign,” and where the United States
219
exercised legislative control.
In doing so, the court recognized the foreign policy
considerations illustrated in NRDC v. NRC, stating that “the
government may avoid the EIS requirement where U.S. foreign
policy interests outweigh the benefits derived from preparing an
220
EIS.”
Because there was no conflict of laws between the United
States and Antarctica, the presumption against extraterritoriality did
221
not apply.
The court, however, specifically limited its holding to
Antarctica, where the potential for foreign policy conflicts is low, and
did not decide “how NEPA might apply to actions in a case involving
222
an actual foreign sovereign . . . .”
The District Court for the District of Columbia subsequently
held that NEPA does not require the DoD to prepare an EIS for U.S.
223
military installations in Japan.
Plaintiffs in NEPA Coalition of
Japan v. Aspin argued that, following Massey, the court should apply
224
NEPA extraterritorially. The court again limited its holding to the
225
facts of the case, but held that the legal status of U.S. bases in Japan,
a sovereign nation, “is not analogous to the status of American
226
research stations in Antarctica,” over which no state is sovereign.
The court also determined that requiring the DoD to prepare EISs
would risk interfering with the treaty relationship between the United
States and Japan. The court explained that the United States would
intrude on Japan’s sovereignty in preparing EISs by collecting
227
environmental data from areas outside the base.
Congress,
therefore, did not intend NEPA to apply “where there is a substantial
228
likelihood that treaty relations will be affected.”
Following Aspin, it is unlikely that a court would support the
extraterritorial application of NEPA to overseas military bases in any
sovereign nation. The concerns that the District Court for the
District of Columbia raised in Aspin, that the preparation of EISs in

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id.
Id. at 535.
Id. at 533.
Id. at 537.
NEPA Coal. of Japan v. Aspin, 837 F. Supp. 466, 467 (D.D.C. 1993).
Id.
Id. at 468.
Id. at 467.
Id.
Id.
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accordance with NEPA regulations would intrude on foreign nations’
sovereignty and may conflict with the terms of international
229
agreements, are applicable to U.S. military bases and operations in
any foreign nation. A court would likely determine that, given the
foreign policy implications, Congress did not intend NEPA to apply
extraterritorially to U.S. military activities overseas.
ii. CERCLA
Unlike NEPA, courts have found that Congress clearly did not
intend CERCLA to apply extraterritorially. In Arc Ecology v. U.S.
Department of the Air Force, for example, appellants sought to
compel the DoD to perform a preliminary assessment and cleanup of
230
former U.S. bases in the Philippines. In concluding that Congress
did not intend CERCLA to have extraterritorial effect, the Ninth
Circuit looked at the plain language of the statute. The court
determined that CERCLA’s “general approach, concerns, and
procedures are inimical to judicial challenges to contamination
231
alleged from sites outside the . . . United States.” In support of its
decision, the court showed that, although CERCLA provisions
specify that certain procedures are to be undertaken domestically, it
does not contemplate any similar procedures to be undertaken in
232
foreign countries.
The court also based its conclusion on the foreign policy
implications of applying CERCLA extraterritorially. The court
233
recognized the DoD’s concern, expressed in Directive 6050.7, that
both treaty obligations and the sovereignty of foreign nations must be
respected, and that agencies should exercise restraint in applying U.S.
laws extraterritorially unless Congress has clearly expressed the
234
contrary intent.
The court thus determined that it would be
“unreasonable” to find that Congress intended CERCLA to have
extraterritorial effect, as environmental assessments or cleanups on
foreign soil without an agreement would violate the nation’s

229. Aspin, 837 F. Supp. at 467.
230. Arc Ecology, 411 F.3d at 1094.
231. Id. at 1100.
232. See id.; see also, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(2) (2006) (requiring that the President “consult with
the affected State or States” before determining appropriate remedial action, but providing no
provision for consultation with foreign authorities).
233. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
234. Arc Ecology, 411 F.3d at 1103.
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sovereignty, and would “impermissibly encroach” on the U.S.
235
President’s foreign affairs authority.
As a result of Arc Ecology’s holding, that Congress did not
intend CERCLA to apply extraterritorially to regulate overseas bases
in the Philippines, it is unlikely that any court would require the
DoD’s environmental policies in any nation to comply with
CERCLA.
b. Effects Test
Under the effects test, NEPA and CERCLA may be applied
extraterritorially where failure to do so would result in adverse effects
236
within the United States.
The effects test allows legislation to
regulate foreign conduct that is likely to cause “foreseeable and
237
substantial” harmful effects within the United States.
The test is
illustrated by Hirt v. Richardson, in which plaintiffs requested a
preliminary injunction, alleging that the Department of Energy had
violated NEPA by failing to prepare an EIS related to a U.S.-funded
238
shipment of nuclear wastes. The wastes were to have been shipped
from Russia to Canada, but would pass close to the U.S. border on
239
their way through Canada. The District Court stated that “the facts
240
It
in this case warrant extraterritorial application of NEPA.”
concluded that plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their argument that
the Department of Energy had been arbitrary and capricious in
failing to prepare an EIS because the U.S. federal government
exercised control over the Russian shipment and an accident,
however remote the possibility, would substantially affect the United
241
States.
Here, NEPA and CERCLA may not be applied extraterritorially
to overseas military bases and operations under the effects test.
Failure to apply these statutes to overseas military activities likely will
not result in “foreseeable and substantial” effects within the United
States.

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 1099.
Massey, 986 F.2d at 531.
Tamari v. Bache & Co., 730 F.2d 1103, 1106 n.6 (7th Cir. 1984).
Hirt v. Richardson, 127 F. Supp. 2d 833, 837 (W.D. Mich. 1999).
Id. at 836–37.
Id. at 844.
Id. at 844–45.
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c. Conduct Test
Under the conduct test, legislation is deemed to apply
domestically where the conduct regulated by the legislation occurs in
242
the United States.
NEPA and CERCLA may, therefore, impose
liability on foreign corporations, or on U.S. actors for harmful
activities committed overseas, where the conduct regulated by the
243
statutes occurs within the United States.
For example, in Massey,
the D.C. Circuit determined that, because NEPA is a procedural
rather than a substantive statute, the conduct it regulates is the
244
decision-making of federal agencies.
Since the NSF’s decisionmaking processes occurred within the United States, requiring the
NSF to prepare an EIS before incinerating food wastes in Antarctica
was a domestic, rather than an extraterritorial, application of
245
NEPA.
In Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., the Ninth Circuit
concluded that CERCLA regulates the “actual or threatened release”
246
of hazardous substances.
Plaintiffs filed suit under CERCLA’s
“citizen suit” provision to compel the Environmental Protection
Agency to enforce an order it had issued against Teck Cominco
Metals, Ltd., a Canadian corporation, requiring it to conduct a
remedial investigation/feasibility study in a portion of the Columbia
River located entirely within the United States, where hazardous
substances that Teck Cominco had discharged in Canada had
247
accumulated. The court held that, because the “release” occurred
within the United States, CERCLA was applied domestically, rather
248
than extraterritorially, to impose liability on Teck Cominco.
Here, the application of NEPA to overseas military activities
would likely be considered domestic, as the majority of the DoD’s
249
decision-making likely occurs within the United States.
The
application of CERCLA would almost certainly be considered

242. Massey, 986 F.2d at 531.
243. See id.
244. Id. at 532.
245. See id.
246. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1079 (9th Cir. 2006), cert.
denied, 128 S. Ct. 858 (2008).
247. Id. at 1068.
248. Id. at 1079.
249. See Massey, 986 F.2d at 532 (“[T]he decisionmaking processes of federal agencies take
place almost exclusively in [the United States] . . . .”).
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extraterritorial, as any “releases” are unlikely to occur within the
250
United States.
Yet, even if NEPA and CERCLA were determined to apply to
government action overseas under either the conduct or effects tests,
courts must still balance the benefits of preparing an EIS against
251
foreign policy considerations.
Thus, for example, the Hirt Court
declined to issue an injunction preventing the transportation of
nuclear wastes from Russia to Canada, despite the fact that plaintiffs
were injured by the Department of Energy’s failure to prepare an
252
EIS. The Court cited the “weighty considerations” of U.S. foreign
policy, nuclear non-proliferation, and the interests of the President in
253
carrying out U.S. foreign policy.
Furthermore, in Aspin, the D.C.
Circuit limited Massey’s holding, which could be read to indicate that
NEPA may always be applied extraterritorially, to the unique facts of
254
the case. The court then stated that, even if NEPA could be applied
extraterritorially, the DoD would not be required to prepare EISs, as
U.S. foreign policy interests outweighed the benefits of
255
environmental assessment.
Therefore, in the case of environmental regulation of overseas
military bases and operations, courts would likely determine that (1)
Congress did not intend NEPA and CERCLA to apply under
circumstances implicating such weighty foreign policy considerations;
and (2) even if NEPA and CERCLA could be applied
extraterritorially, foreign policy considerations would outweigh any
benefits gained from the DoD’s preparation of EISs.
Any improvements in DoD environmental policy for overseas
military bases, therefore, likely would not be effected through
extraterritorial application of NEPA and CERCLA.
C. Executive Orders
Executive orders can improve DoD overseas environmental
policy in ways in which international agreements and applicable
federal statutes cannot. First, the President has unquestionable
constitutional authority to issue executive orders under Article II,
250. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (2006) (defining “release”); Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1079.
251. See Massey, 986 F.2d at 533; Aspin, 837 F. Supp. at 468.
252. Hirt, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 849.
253. Id.
254. See Aspin, 837 F. Supp. at 466.
255. Id. at 468.
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Section 3, instructing that the President “shall take care that the laws
256
be faithfully executed.” The President, as “commander in chief of
the Army and the Navy,” has even greater authority to issue
257
executive orders pertaining to the DoD.
Furthermore, directing
overseas environmental policy through executive orders can effect
improvements on a broad array of military actions overseas. For
instance, although DoD oversees environmental compliance policies,
as stated in the OEBGD and FGS, do not apply to operational
258
deployments, the environmental annexes in operations plans that
259
accompany such operations are subject to executive orders.
Through executive orders, the President may also effect the
extraterritorial application of environmental principles expressed in
domestic statutes.
President Carter’s Executive Order 12114
regarding the environmental effects of federal actions abroad, for
instance, stated that, although based on independent authority, the
Order’s purpose was to further the goals of NEPA, as well as a
260
number of other environmental regulatory statutes.
Thus, like
section 102(2)(C) of NEPA, the Order required the preparation and
consideration of an EIS before undertaking a “major Federal action
261
significantly affecting the environment.” In essence, the Order gave
extraterritorial effect to NEPA without implicating concerns that
extraterritorial application of federal statutes would impermissibly
262
infringe on the President’s foreign affairs authority.
Although,
given the Order’s broad exceptions, compliance with E.O. 12114 is
263
not necessarily analogous to compliance with NEPA, the Order was
264
able to export the statute’s spirit and many of its core requirements.
Finally, executive orders have proven the most effective at
eliciting improvements in DoD overseas environmental policy. The
DoD has, for instance, issued new policy statements in response to

256. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
257. See id. § 2, cl. 1.
258. INSTRUCTION 4715.5, supra note 51, § 2.1.4; OEBGD, supra note 52, § C1.3.3.
259. Phelps, supra note 15, at 69–70.
260. E.O. 12114, supra note 26, § 1-1.
261. Id. § 2-3; National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006).
262. See, e.g., Arc Ecology, 411 F.3d at 1099 ; Hirt, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 849; Greenpeace USA,
748 F. Supp. at 760–61.
263. See Greenpeace USA, 748 F. Supp. at 762 (“The court cannot conclude . . . that
Executive Order 12114 preempts application of NEPA to all federal agency actions taken
outside the United States.”).
264. See Fair, supra note 45, at 117.
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265

E.O. 12114. Although the DoD’s response was inadequate to effect
environmental protection at overseas military bases and during
operations, any inadequacies were the result of exemptions or
ambiguities in the Order itself, not in the DoD’s response to the
266
Order.
An executive order that did not contain such weaknesses
would, therefore, have to be implemented by the DoD, and would
likely result in more protective environmental policies.
IV. EXECUTIVE ORDER: A PROPOSAL
An executive order reaffirming the United States’ commitment
to environmental protection abroad and issuing standards for the
DoD at overseas military bases and during operations is the best
means of effecting improvements in DoD overseas environmental
policy. A successful executive order must balance competing
considerations, including the need to: (1) set adequate environmental
standards without loopholes; (2) provide commanders discretion and
flexibility in uncertain overseas environments; (3) respect foreign
countries’ right to sovereignty; and (4) respect any international
treaties signed with the host countries. An executive order that
rigidly imposes the highest environmental standards on the DoD
might satisfy an ideal vision of how the DoD should conduct its
environmental policies overseas, but would likely be resented and
largely ignored by military base commanders implementing the
policy. The proposal for a new Executive Order below, therefore,
attempts to balance these competing considerations while furthering
the goal of environmental protection abroad.
The Executive Order also attempts to provide guiding principles
for commanders so that they may fill gaps in the DoD’s current policy
regarding assessment, compliance, prevention, and remediation. The
Executive Order would replace E.O. 12114 to definitively set higher
267
standards with fewer exemptions.
Additionally, the Executive
Order would address environmental regulation both at military bases
and during military operations. The express exemptions for military
operations in many of the DoD’s policies, as in Instruction 4715.5 and
268
the OEBGD, and the implied exemptions for operations that could
be read into other policies, such as through the “participating nation

265.
266.
267.
268.

See supra Part II.A, .B.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.A.1.
See supra Part II.B.
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exemption,” leave critical gaps in the regulation of much of the U.S.
forces’ overseas military activities. The Executive Order thus
promotes a comprehensive regime of environmental principles and
standards applicable to U.S. military actions worldwide.
In order to further this goal, the Executive Order must first state
the principles under which it is being issued. The broadest principle,
and that which is accepted to the greatest extent by the international
community, is principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, as
270
reaffirmed in the Rio Declaration.
The Executive Order should
thus state, in general terms, its reaffirmation and approval of the
principle that “[s]tates have . . . the responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to
the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
271
national jurisdiction.”
Following this broad reaffirmation, the
Executive Order should indicate that it is based on the President’s
constitutional authority (rather than any statutory authority granted
by Congress). The Executive Order should also state that it is being
issued with the purpose of furthering the goals of procedural statutes
such as NEPA and CERCLA, and, to the extent possible given
varying environmental conditions overseas and concern for the
sovereignty of host nations, substantive statutes such as the Resource
272
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), the Clean Air
273
274
Act, and the Clean Water Act. In this way, the Executive Order
would effect both pollution prevention and remediation. Any agency
interpreting the Executive Order would also be fully aware of the
principles which must be furthered by its interpretation.
The Executive Order’s standards must also be, to the greatest
extent possible, equivalent to those in NEPA, CERCLA, and other
domestic environmental statutes, rather than reflecting a minimum
standard reserved for overseas bases and operations. If Congress has
determined that standards such as those embodied in NEPA and

269. See supra Part II.A.2.
270. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 159, part II, art. 21; Rio Declaration, supra note
160, para. 2.
271. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 159, part II, art. 21. The United States reaffirmed
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration in a 1991 treaty with Canada regarding
transboundary air pollution. It is not, therefore, impossible that it might do so again. See U.S.Canada Treaty, supra note 164.
272. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6922k
(2006).
273. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006).
274. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006).
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CERCLA are necessary to ensure the safety and health of the
American people and their environment, there is no reason that
lesser standards should be acceptable for those of other nations. To
implement such a policy is to admit that their health and their
environment are less valuable than Americans’. Additionally, setting
overseas environmental standards in accordance with those of host
nations will, in many instances, fail to provide adequate
environmental regulations, as many host nations do not implement,
275
or enforce, effective environmental policies.
Furthermore, as the
GAO states, it is “essential” that U.S. regulations be used in nations
where operations take place in order to protect U.S. personnel—
“[n]ot protecting U.S. personnel and the environment just because a
host country does not enforce its environmental laws does not appear
276
to be prudent.”
Thus, just as E.O. 12114 imported the EIS requirement and
language of NEPA, this Executive Order should import both the EIS
requirement of NEPA and the assessment and remediation
requirements of CERCLA in order to effect change in the DoD’s
277
overseas environmental policy.
In particular, NEPA and
CERCLA’s requirements regarding the DoD’s obligations prior to,
and following, the closure of military bases should be imported to
remedy some of the most lacking provisions of DoD overseas
278
environmental policy.
Although environmental standards would,
ideally, exceed those set in NEPA and CERCLA to achieve
significant improvements, these are standards which Congress
understands and for which it is capable of budgeting. These are also
standards that the DoD has experience implementing in the United
States, and would thus be more successfully applied abroad than
newly heightened standards.
In importing the requirements of NEPA and CERCLA, the
Executive Order must clearly define their key terms and avoid
exemptions through which the DoD may circumvent compliance.
Clearly defined standards would also effect uniformly adequate
protection and avoid confusion within the DoD regarding
implementation. Thus, the Executive Order’s key terms should be

275. See supra Part II.B.
276. GAO HAZARDOUS WASTE REPORT, supra note 12, at 25–26.
277. See supra Part III.B.1.
278. See supra Part III.B.1. It may not be possible, or advisable, to impose the requirements
of substantive statutes, such as the RCRA, Clean Air Act, and Clean Water Act on sovereign
foreign nations.
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defined with reference to the relevant definitions of NEPA,
CERCLA, and other relevant statutes. Where ambiguities exist, the
Executive Order should clearly define the term, taking into
consideration its interpretation by federal agencies. For instance,
E.O. 12144 defined the term “significantly affects the environment”
as an action that does “significant harm to the environment,” leaving
the meaning of the term “significant” to the discretion of agency
officials. Although NEPA also left the term ambiguous, the
Department of State explained that, in reviewing for potentially
significant environmental effects abroad, an agency official should
consider potential direct effects on the . . . environment . . . which
may be caused by the action and occur at the same time and place.
[The agency official] should also consider reasonably foreseeable
significant indirect effects on the natural and physical environment
279
potentially caused by the action but occurring later in time.

The Department of State also specified five categories which the
official must consider in determining whether an action is
280
“significant.”
Rather than leaving such interpretations to agency
discretion, the Order should specify such standards itself.
The Order, however, must balance these standards with the need
for commanders to have the discretion and flexibility to quickly and
effectively respond to national security concerns, operations such as
peacekeeping missions, and changing host nation conditions at
overseas military bases. The preparation of an EIS in such situations
may not be possible, or, if possible, may result in detrimental delays.
Rather than including broad exemptions for all actions requiring
heightened discretion and flexibility, the Order should allow for an
exemption only when the preparation of an EIS is not possible. The
Order should specify that, if the DoD could not conduct an EIS prior
to taking action, it must undertake remedial efforts in those areas in
which the United States maintains a presence. This requirement may
deter commanders from seeking an exemption when an EIS truly was
feasible.
If host country conditions will not allow for either an EIS or
281
remedial action, as was the case in Somalia, then the DoD must use
the latest technology available (not the latest technology currently
available in that host country) in order to build pollution-prevention
strategies into every aspect of its operational plans. Such strategies
279. Environmental Review Procedures, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,004, 67,006 (Nov. 21, 1979).
280. Id.
281. See supra Part II.B.
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must be both planned and implemented in order to significantly
reduce contamination, or the risk of contamination.
Furthermore, any exemptions that commanders request from the
default standard of environmental assessment and remediation must
be granted by the President, not by the DoD. The President would
have the power to delegate this authority to other executive branch
administrators in the DoD or the Environmental Protection Agency.
This provision would provide a measure of oversight for the
implementation of the Executive Order. Therefore, while uniform
standards for environmental assessment and remediation must be
clearly defined in order to ensure compliance with the goals of the
Executive Order, commanders will be given some discretion and
flexibility regarding the implementation of these standards.
Many military officials have expressed concern that unilaterally
applying U.S. environmental standards would violate host nations’
282
right to sovereignty, causing political or diplomatic problems.
However, enforcing U.S. regulations on portions of military bases
where U.S. operations, such as maintenance of aircraft, are taking
283
place would not likely cause political or diplomatic problems. Yet,
because, as the GAO states, problems would result if the DoD
enforced U.S. laws on host country operations on other parts of
284
military bases,
the Executive Order must include provisions
protecting the sovereignty of host nations.
The most effective provision would be one requiring the
Department of State, when negotiating international agreements such
as SOFAs and basing agreements, to negotiate for provisions
including concrete substantive and procedural environmental
standards based on U.S. regulations. This would be in stark contrast
to the current policy of negotiating to eliminate concrete
environmental requirements. The treaties should specify that if host
country laws provide more protection than U.S. environmental
standards, the more protective laws, as written, should govern.
Including heightened regulatory standards in agreements between the
U.S. and host countries would thus avoid concerns that

282. See, e.g., GAO HAZARDOUS WASTE REPORT, supra note 12, at 25; Hamilton, supra
note 23, at 4; Phelps, supra note 15, at 79–80.
283. GAO HAZARDOUS WASTE REPORT, supra note 12, at 25.
284. Id.
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environmental regulations would interfere with host nations’
285
sovereignty, U.S. foreign policy, and treaty agreements.
Furthermore, the DoD should negotiate environmental
assessments and remediation with the host country. Like the United
States’ nuclear non-proliferation policy, one of the DoD’s goals in
negotiating with the host country should be to encourage safe
286
environmental practices.
As the D.C. Circuit explained,
“[n]onproliferation cannot be achieved by nonparticipation by the
United States in the world commerce in nuclear machinery and
materials; our policy set by the Congress recognizes that American
abstention from international nuclear trade risks leaving the field to
less responsible suppliers and encouraging uncontrolled
287
proliferation.” This logic is applicable to environmental regulation
as well—unless the United States actively participates in the
environmental protection of host countries, particularly where it is
responsible for the environmental damage, it will be encouraging
uncontrolled environmental harm.

285. See supra note 41 and accompanying text; Arc Ecology, 411 F.3d at 1103; Aspin, 837 F.
Supp. at 467.
286. See NRDC v. NRC, 647 F.2d at 1347.
287. Id.

